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ARGUMENT 
WWC Holding Co., Inc. ("Western Wireless") files this Reply Brief in response to 
the briefs of the Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") and the Utah Rural 
Telephone Association ("URTA").1 All parties agree that the Commission had a 
responsibility to conduct a balancing test to determine whether the public interest was 
met by designating Western Wireless as an additional eligible telecommunications carrier 
("ETC") in the areas served by the affected URTA companies. Western Wireless filed a 
clear and specific challenge to the findings and conclusions that impacted the 
Commission's balancing test. In doing so Western Wireless presented narrow issues for 
appeal: 
1. Should the Commission have found that designating Western Wireless as 
an additional ETC will bring public interest benefits of competition, 
increased subscribership, larger local calling areas, and mobility? The 
answer is clearly "yes" based on the undisputed record evidence. 
2. Whether the Commission lawfully considered in its public interest 
determination the possibility the State Fund might increase in size with the 
designation of Western Wireless? The answer to this legal question is 
clearly "no" as a matter of federal and state law. 
Once the Court corrects the Commission's errors stated in the Order, several public 
interest benefits will weigh in favor of Westem Wireless' designation, and no detriments 
will weigh against the designation. A balancing of these factors clearly compels the 
conclusion that the public interest is served by designating Western Wireless as an ETC 
in each of the URTA companies' service areas. 
Western Wireless' Initial Brief is cited as "WW Br.," The Commission's Brief is cited 
as "Com. Br," and URTA's Brief is cited as "URTA Br." 
1 
Rather than respond to these specific appeal issues, the Commission and URTA 
wade through the entire record and seek to re-litigate the entire case. They rely on 
arguments previously made to the Commission rather than what the Commission stated in 
the Order as a basis for its public interest determination. In doing so they forget that 
Western Wireless prevailed on nearly every issue in this case, and that the only detriment 
found by the Commission had nothing to do with Western Wireless' service, network, or 
satisfaction of the basic ETC criteria. Thus, suggestions that Western Wireless failed to 
try its case effectively or r failed to explai: network or services (Com. Br., p. 17) 
are nothing more than attempts to cloud the issues before the Court. In taking this 
approach, the Commission and URTA respond only superficially to Western Wireless' 
discussion of tn. -disputed record of consumer benefits, and the Federal 
Communications Commission's ("FCC") interpretation of the public interest standard in 
47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2). 
The Court she cep focused on the issues presented for appeal, should 
recognize the findings and conclusions not challenged on appeal, and su* • reject 
attempts by the Commission and URTA to re-try this case. Western Wireless urges the 
Court iie Order, thereby taking the action necessary to bring the benefits of 
competitive universal service to rural consumers in Utah. 
2 
I. WESTERN WIRELESS PROPERLY STATES THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW AND SEEKS APPROPRIATE RELIEF 
The Commission and URTA misstate the proper standard review and question the 
authority of this Court to correct the errors of fact and law made in the Order. Western 
Wireless challenged one specific finding of fact, three findings which the Commission 
failed to make, and two legal conclusions. WW Br., p. 2. With regard to findings of fact 
(both made and not made), Western Wireless has the burden to show the Commission's 
Order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or is arbitrary and 
capricious. Id. With regard to the two legal challenges, this Court reviews those 
questions de novo. Id. 
The Commission and URTA fail to recognize these separate points of appeal, and 
instead attempt to lump all of the issues together and claim there is one mixed question of 
fact and law - whether the public interest standard was met. Com. Br., p. 9 (evidence as 
a whole does not show a net public interest benefit); URTA Br., p. 11. Moreover, the 
Commission and URTA attempt to backfill the analysis by arguing alleged detriments 
that were not adopted as findings of fact by the Commission or stated as part of the 
Commission's public interest rationale in the Order. Characterizing it this way is an 
attempt to avoid having to justify the Commission's specific errors of fact and law 
challenged on this appeal. Wliile the public interest factor is clearly a balancing test 
(Com. Br., p. 9; URTA Br., p. 10), Western Wireless does not challenge the balancing 
per se, it challenges what was balanced. Meaningful review of the agency's action 
3 
requires that Western Wireless have the ability to challenge the findings and the 
conclusion that determined what would be balanced. 
In addition, the Commission and URTA (using identical language and citations) 
claim Western Wireless seeks improper relief, and suggests this Court has no power to 
make findings 1u lie Commission or to make partial modifications of the 
Commission's Order. Com. Br., p. 7; URTA Br., p. 16. This argument is plainly wrong, 
and is based on cases that were not appealed pursuant to the Utah Administrative 
Procedures /\( I I",\ PA").3 The APA specifically gives the Court authority in its "review 
of formal adjudicative proceedings" to "order agency action," to "order the agency to 
exercise its discretion as required by law," or to "set aside or modify" the order appealed 
from: Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17(b) (Siipp. ADD-1). This attempt by the Commission 
and URTA to ignore the APA and tie this Court's hands on appeal is the first sign they 
cannot rebut Western Wireless' arguments on the merits. 
I HE COMMISSION AND URTA IGNORE FINDINGS MADE IN THE 
ORDER THAT ARE NOT CHALLENGED ON APPEAI, 
Reading the briefs of the Commission and URTA one would not guess that 
Western Wireless has already been designated as an ETC by the FCC, as well as state 
commissions in Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Noi tl 1 Dakota, Soi itl 1 Dakota. Oklal ion la, 
2
 In its Order, the Commission determined there were no benefits, and one detrimental 
impact, making the balancing test quite simple. Western Wireless asks the Court to add 
four benefits and eliminate the detrimental impact, which would make the balancing test 
just as easy. Thus, the focus of this appeal is not the act of balancing, but instead what is 
put on either side of the scale. 
3
 For Example, in Telecommunications Resellers of Utah v. PSC, the Court's review was 
governed by Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16. 747 P.2d 1029, 1030-31 (Utah 1987). 
4 
Texas, Colorado, California, Nevada, and Kansas. One would most certainly not guess 
that Western Wireless has also been designated as an ETC in Utah by the Utah 
Commission. The fact is, however, the Commission in its Order rejected countless 
challenges to Western Wireless' Petition and found Western Wireless met the 
requirements of Section 214(e)(1) and state law for designation as an ETC, including 
provision of services required of all ETCs, and the intent and ability to advertise and 
provide those services throughout the requested designated service areas. DI 198, pp. 5-
12, 13-15. The Order thus represents the Commission's rejection of the same claims now 
argued on appeal, including that Western Wireless' Petition lacked specificity (DI 172, p. 
10; DI 180, pp. 4-5), lacked detail as to its network (DI 180, pp. 5-6; DI 173, pp. 5-7), 
and did not allow for appropriate regulatory oversight (DI 172, pp. 15-16), among many 
others. 
In an attempt to justify the Order's outcome on the public interest question, the 
Commission and URTA argue these exact same points, and even suggest these issues 
were resolved against Western Wireless below. For example, URTA states that: 
"Because of the dearth of detail, the Commission was justifiably concerned about what it 
was Western Wireless intended to offer, at what price and when it intended to offer 
services." URTA Br., p. 22; see also Com. Br., p. 11. This is simply untrue - nothing in 
the Order suggests the Commission had any such concerns, and it most certainly was not 
a factor in the Order's public interest analysis. 
4
 Moreover, the FCC specifically recognizes that an ETC applicant cannot be expected 
to finalize its business plans prior to being designated an ETC. In the Matter of Federal-
5 
The same can be said for the Commission's argument that Western Wireless failed 
to show sufficient coverage on its network to provide the services. Com. Br., p. 12; see 
also URTA Br., pp. 18-21. To the contrary, the Order specifically found that Western 
Wireless demonstrated full coverage on its network in both Qwest exchanges and URTA 
study areas in the Petition. DI 198, pp. 11-12. As to the URTA companies' areas, the 
Commission found "Western Wireless is licensed and provides the supported services 
throughout these companies' study areas." DI 198, p. 12. The Commission dismissed 
claims of inadequate coverage in Qwest areas by stating that "to the extent there might be 
a few small and discrete areas not within Western Wireless' existing signal coverage," 
Western Wireless would extend its service within a reasonable time. DI 198, p. 11. The 
Commission's claim on appeal that lack of coverage or detail regarding the network was 
or should be part of the public interest analysis is clearly without merit. Compare also 
the Commission's argument that Western Wireless provides substandard service (CB, pp. 
10-11) with the Order's findings that Western Wireless meets or exceeds all service 
requirements for ETCs (DI 198, pp. 7-11). 
By making these arguments the Commission and URTA contradict findings made 
in the Order and not challenged on appeal. The Court should reject these assertions as 
being contrary to the Commission's Order and beyond the scope of review, and should 
State Joint Board on Universal Service, Western Wireless Corporation Petition for 
Preemption of an Order of the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission, Declaratory 
Ruling, CC Docket No. 96-45, FCC 00-248, ^ 13 (rel. Aug. 10, 2000) ("South Dakota 
Order") (Supp. ADD-2). 
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review only the specific findings and conclusions properly challenged by Western 
Wireless. 
III. THE COMMISSION AND URTA CAN NOT DISPUTE THAT THE 
APPLICATION OF THE FCC'S PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS 
REQUIRES DESIGNATION OF WESTERN WIRELESS AS AN ETC 
The FCC's recent interpretation of the public interest standard in the Wyoming 
Order represents the FCC's binding interpretation of federal law. The FCC is the 
implementing agency for the Act (Sprint Spectrum v. State Corp. Comm'n of Ks., 149 
F.3d 1058, 1061 (10n Cir. 1998)), and its rules and orders can be set aside only by the 
federal courts of appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). Applying this FCC standard as required 
by federal law eliminates the only adverse impact found in the Order, and recognizes the 
benefits of Western Wireless' ETC designation. See WW Br., pp. 32-33. The Court must 
acknowledge the FCC's authority to interpret federal law and apply its interpretation of 
the public interest standard to correct the Commission's Order. 
It is clear from the Wyoming Order that the Commission erred by failing to 
consider the general benefits of competition as a factor that supports a public interest 
finding. WW Br., pp. 23-25. Like the FCC's Wyoming Order, the Commission should 
have recognized that: 
[A]n important goal of the Act is to open local telecommunications markets 
to competition. Designation of competitive ETCs promotes competition 
and benefits consumers in rural and high-cost areas by increasing customer 
choice, innovative services, and new technologies. 
Wyoming Order, ^ 17 (ADD-80); see also id f 1 (ADD-73) ("we find that the 
designation of Western Wireless as an ETC in those areas served by rural telephone 
7 
companies serves the public interest by promoting competition"). In failing to recognize 
public interest benefits of competition, the Commission left a significant piece out of the 
public interest equation. 
The Commission also erred by ignoring undisputed record evidence of specific 
consumer benefits, including increased subscribership, mobility, and a larger local calling 
area. WW Br., pp. 25-32. The FCC's Wyoming Order recognizes the public interest is 
served because some consumers will benefit from large local calling areas and the 
provision of wireless local loop service. ADD-82. The Wyoming Order thus supports 
Western Wireless' argument that these consumer benefits should have been a part of the 
Commission's public interest analysis.5 
Finally, the FCC interpreted the public interest standard and determined: 
Congress was concerned that consumers in areas served by rural telephone 
companies continue to be adequately served should the incumbent 
telephone company exercise its option to relinquish its ETC designation 
under Section 214(e)(4). 
Wyoming Order, f^ 18 (ADD-81). Wliile such relinquishment could be a threat if 
competition were not sustainable, the FCC "[rejected] the general argument that rural 
areas are not capable of sustaining competition for universal service support," and 
The Commission and URTA attempt to distinguish the Wyoming Order by claiming 
that Western Wireless provided more information to the FCC than it did in this case. 
Com. Br., p. 17, fn. 3; URTA Br., p. 18 fn. 6. Nothing in the record of this appeal 
supports such a view. The filing made by Western Wireless in the Wyoming docket is 
not part of the record on appeal so no comparison can be drawn. In fact, there was a far 
greater degree of information and specificity in this proceeding, which involved 
discovery, testimony, and three days of hearings. The Wyoming docket was decided only 
on written submissions. More importantly, the level of specificity did not play any role 
in the FCC's public interest analysis. See Wyoming Order, ^j 16-22 (ADD-80). 
8 
required rural LECs to prove this detriment based on empirical evidence. Wyoming 
Order, 1flf 20, 22 (ADD-81). 
The Commission's Order cannot be squared with this FCC public interest analysis 
for two reasons. First, the Commission's funding rules for the State Fund guarantee the 
URTA companies a statutory rate of return, thereby eliminating any possibility that the 
incumbent will be harmed by competition to the detriment of consumers. DI 198, p. 12. 
Under this funding scheme, no consumers are put at risk, which is the potential detriment 
Section 214(e)(2) was intended to guard against. Wyoming Order, f 20 (ADD-81) ("we 
decline to conclude this constitutes a serious risk to consumers") (emphasis added). The 
Commission and URTA utterly fail to address this significant point.6 Second, the only 
finding the Commission made was that it was possible that the size of the State Fund 
might need to increase with the presence of a competitor. DI 198, p. 13. There was no 
finding that each URTA area cannot support competition, and instead the Commission's 
Order relied acted on a general argument because it might prove to be true.7 
6
 Although URTA claims the potential for relinquishment should be considered (URTA 
Br., p. 35), the Commission made no finding that this was a risk, and the current funding 
scheme makes that an impossibility. Moreover, even Dr. Compton testified that 
relinquishment was not a realistic threat. DI 300, pp. 24-26. 
7
 The Commission's brief claims Dr. Compton conducted an analysis of URTA study 
areas as was contemplated by the FCC in the Wyoming Order. Com. Br., p. 19. To the 
contrary, Dr. Compton looked only generally to whether population growth was fast or 
slow, and the Commission made no findings based on this testimony. DI 300, pp. 9-11. 
In fact, both DPU/CCS and URTA admitted in their post-hearing briefs that no one 
conducted a detailed analysis of whether URTA areas can accommodate competition. DI 
172, p. 5 ("We recognize that no detailed empirical study was performed as to the affect 
on rural companies for granting ETC status"); DI 180, p. 12 fn.7 ("URTA has not 
9 
In short, the FCCs public interest analysis properly focuses on the consumer, is 
binding, and it is patently inconsistent with the Commission's public interest analysis 
below. The Court should recognize the clear path set by the FCC and use that analysis as 
a basis to reverse the Commission's Order and grant Western Wireless the relief it has 
requested in this proceeding. 
IV. THE COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS OF BENEFITS 
OF WESTERN WIRELESS1 DESIGNATION AS AN ADDITIONAL ETC 
The Commission erred by finding that there would be no benefits weighing in 
favor of designating Western Wireless as an additional ETC in any study area of a rural 
telephone company. The Commission should have recognized and weighed several 
undisputed benefits as part of its public interest balancing test based on the record 
o 
evidence. Compare DI 222, pp. 622-23 (Dr. Compton agrees there will be specific 
benefits of Western Wireless' service). By failing to do so, the Commission ignored 
undisputed benefits designating Western Wireless as an ETC. 
submitted specific studies showing the impact designating WWC an ETC would have in 
the rural companies impacted."). 
o 
URTA claims the Order did not find there would be "no benefits," but instead found 
that unspecified detriments outweighed the benefits. URTA Br., p. 9 fn.2. URTA is 
wrong. The Commission neither recognized nor weighed any public interest benefits as 
part of its balancing test. DI 198, pp. 12-13. In seeking reconsideration Western 
Wireless specifically requested findings of the benefits of competition, increased 
subscribership, mobility, and a larger local calling area, but the Commission declined to 
reconsider or clarify its Order. DI 210, pp. 3-6. 
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A. The Order Should Have Reflected General Benefits of Bringing 
Competition to URTA Service Areas. 
Given the clear mandates of the federal Act, the orders of the FCC, and the Utah 
Legislature's mandatory directives, there is simply no way to justify the Commission's 
failure to give any consideration to the fact that granting Western Wireless' Petition will 
bring benefits of competitive universal service to rural consumers in Utah. Neither 
URTA nor the Commission argues this point, they simply claim that competition should 
not be the only factor in the public interest equation. Com. Br., pp. 8-9; URTA Br., p. 8. 
Western Wireless agrees that competition should not be the only factor, and has never 
claimed otherwise. In fact, Western Wireless quite clearly said that competition "must be 
found to be a consideration" in the public interest determination. WW Br., p. 25 
i 
(emphasis added). While competition is not the only factor, however, it must be part of 
the balancing test, and the Commission's failure to give any weight to this public interest 
benefit is clear error. 
The FCC's Wyoming Order directs that competition is a goal of the Act and a 
benefit that advances the public interest. Wyoming Order, fflf 1, 17 (ADD-73, 80). As 
pointed out in Western Wireless' Initial Brief, there was agreement on the record that 
competition is presumed to be in the public interest. WW Br., p. 24. This presumption is 
consistent with the statutory directives of the Utah Legislature to the Commission. See 
11 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-86-1.1. For these reasons the Commission erred by failing to find 
in its Order that competition is a benefit to be weighed in the public interest analysis. 
B. The Order Should Have Reflected the Benefit of Increased 
Subscribership. 
The Commission specifically recognized that increased subscribership would be a 
benefit that would weigh in favor of the public interest. DI 198, p. 13. Western Wireless 
in its Initial Brief pointed to the uncontradicted record evidence that demonstrates 
Western Wireless could and would serve consumers who currently do not have landline 
telephone service. WW Br., pp. 25-26. The record evidence shows there are consumers 
in the URTA study areas who do not have service due to the cost of extending land-line 
facilities. Id. Because Western Wireless' network could serve those consumers 
immediately (without imposing line extension costs) Department witness Dr. Compton 
identified that as a "big benefit" of Western Wireless' designation. DI 222, p. 633. The 
Commission simply ignored Dr. Compton's testimony when it concluded Western 
Wireless would not serve any unserved consumers. DI 198, p. 13. 
9
 Other state commissions (like the FCC) have also begun their public interest analysis 
with a presumption that competition was in the public interest. See, e.g., In the Matter of 
GCC License Corporation, Kansas Corporation Comm'n Docket No. 99-GCCZ-156-
ETC, Order No. 10, p. 4 (May 19, 2000) (competition in rural telephone company service 
areas is presumed to be in the public interest) (Supp. ADD-63); Application of WWC 
Texas RSA Limited Partnership for Designation as an Eligible Telecommunications 
Carrier Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 214(e) and PUC Subst. R. 26.418, Texas Public Utilities 
Commission Docket Nos. 22289 and 22295, Order, p. 19 (Oct. 30, 2000) (clear policy in 
favor of competitive telecommunications markets); In the Matter of Western Wireless 
Holding Co., Inc., Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm'n Docket No. 00K-255T, Decision on 
Exceptions, p. 16 (rel. May 4, 2001) ("Both federal and state statutes establish the public 
policy of promoting competition in telecommunications markets.") (Supp. ADD-42). 
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The Commission does not point to any record evidence supporting its decision, but 
instead argues that Western Wireless 1) has large gaps in its coverage, and 2) would 
extend service (like the incumbent) only if it were reimbursed dollar-for-dollar for that 
line extension by either the customer or a universal service fund. Com. Br., p. 12. First 
(and again), the Order itself does not contain any findings of fact to support the argument. 
To the contrary, the Commission found Western Wireless has existing service throughout 
the URTA territories, and did not find the gaps the Commission now tries to rely on. DI 
198, p. 12. Second, the evidence shows that Western Wireless committed to ensuring 
strong signal coverage for each such customer without additional charge, even if 
engineering means were needed to ensure a strong signal. DI 220, pp. 44-45. The 
suggestion that Western Wireless would "draw upon the universal service funds to make 
these expansions" (Com. Br., p. 12) mischaracterizes the testimony cited.10 
The Court should read Dr. Compton's testimony and should determine that he gave 
undisputed testimony that as an ETC Western Wireless will provide universal service to 
some Utah residents who do not have it today. DI 222, pp. 632-33. As the FCC has said, 
"[a]t the simplest level, increasing the number of people connected to the 
telecommunications network makes the network more valuable to all of its users." 
10
 The testimony of Mr. Blundell relied on by the Commission in its brief is that 
Western Wireless would need to receive available subsidies to make its proposed offering 
available ubiquitously. In other words, Western Wireless will undertake an ETC's 
obligations only if designated an ETC. DI 220, pp. 79-80 (cited Com. Br., p. 12). This 
testimony does not support the Commission's reading that Western Wireless would 
extend service to a specific individual only upon a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement from a 
universal service fund. 
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Universal Service Order, ^ 8. An ETC designation that will increase subscribership 
furthers the public interest, and should have been considered by the Commission in the 
public interest balancing test under Section 214(e)(2). 
C. The Order Should Have Reflected That a Larger Local Calling Area 
Would Provide Benefits to Some Consumers. 
Western Wireless pointed to undisputed record evidence showing that Western 
Wireless would provide a larger local calling area than the incumbents', and showed it 
was undisputed that some consumers would benefit from this service option. WW Br., 
pp. 28-30. The Commission challenges this argument only by questioning whether the 
local calling area will actually be larger. Com. Br., p. 15. Western Wireless gave clear 
testimony that this feature of cellular technology would be a primary way for Western 
Wireless to distinguish its service from the incumbents': 
We believe, in addition, that the expanded calling area is also another 
component of the public interest that will be served here. We can provide 
that expanded local calling area today. We do for our cellular customers. 
We plan to do this with universal service offering. And as a footnote, we 
launched a demonstration project in Regent, North Dakota, earlier this year 
using this service, and customers have flocked to the service. Among the 
reasons they like it so well in Regent, North Dakota, is the expanded local 
calling area. 
DI 220, p. 14. Once the Commission concedes Western Wireless will offer a larger local 
calling area to consumers, it must concede (as the DPU and CCS witnesses did), that 
some consumers will find this option to be beneficial. See WW Br., pp. 29-30. This 
furthers the public interest and should have been considered by the Commission. 
14 
D. The Order Should Have Reflected That a Mobility Component Would 
Provide Benefits to Some Consumers. 
In its Initial Brief Western Wireless pointed to undisputed record evidence that 1) 
Western Wireless would provide a mobility component not currently available from 
landline ILECs, and 2) this mobility component would benefit some customers in the 
URTA service areas. The Commission's only challenge to this seems to be that "[t]here 
was no evidence that the 'mobility' of Western Wireless' proposed equipment ... was 
different from the 'mobility' currently offered by means of the cordless phones that are 
already available to telephone users of the incumbents' network." Com. Br., p. 16; URTA 
Br., p. 27. In fact, the product specifications for the wireless access unit states clearly 
that it will provide service to "any remote location where phone service is needed and 
cellular networks are available." DI 230. The suggestion, then, that cellular service does 
not provide greater mobility than landline service ignores common sense, common 
knowledge, and the record evidence. Commission Chair Meacham specifically asked 
about the mobility of a wireless unit. DI 220, p. 154. The response (which was not 
challenged by contrary evidence) was that in Western Wireless' universal service 
offerings a wireless access unit will be able to be used wherever its signal could be 
transmitted to and from the nearest cell tower. DI 220, p. 154. This will allow the 
customer to roam 25 miles away from their home. DI 222, p. 610. A mobility 
component that will allow a rural consumer to have access to the network twenty-five 
miles from the consumer's home is obviously not identical to what a cordless telephone 
provides, and shows the Commission's argument to be a red herring. 
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It is undisputed that some consumers will choose to have a universal service 
offering with this option, and will be benefited by having this choice available. Because 
some consumers will benefit, this is a factor that should have been considered as part of 
the public interest examination. 
V. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE STATE FUND MIGHT INCREASE DUE 
TO WESTERN WIRELESS' DESIGNATION IS NOT A FACTOR TO BE 
CONSIDERED UNDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST DETERMINATION 
PURSUANT TO 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2) 
The only negative aspect of Western Wireless' designation stated in the Order was 
the possibility that the State Fund might increase with an additional ETC. DI 198, p. 
13.11 Western Wireless does not challenge the finding that its designation might increase 
the size of the State Fund. Instead, Western Wireless' challenge to this determination is a 
legal one - whether it is consistent with the public interest for the Commission to use this 
possibility as a detriment of designating a competitive ETC. This challenge then, is one 
of law subject to de novo review by this Court.12 
A. The Order's Public Interest Determination Frustrates Federal Law. 
The Commission seeks to justify its protection of monopoly earners to the 
detriment of competition by claiming that Congress recognized the states' "preeminent 
As discussed supra, the Commission made only one finding of a detriment, and none 
others. The Commission's claim that the record shows "overwhelming detriments 
compared to benefits" must be disregarded as not based on any findings in the Order. 
Com. Br., p. 18. 
12
 URTA is wrong to state there was a finding that designation "would result in a 
significantly increased burden on the Fund." URTA Br., p. 22. The Order reflects no 
such finding and the Order instead denied the Petition in the URTA areas "because of the 
possible negative impact." DI 198, p. 13 (emphasis added). 
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role and authority" on universal service matters. Com. Br., p. 22. However, the public 
interest standard is in a federal statute that governs federal universal service dollars. See 
DI 198, p. 7 (ADD-7). The United States Supreme Court has recognized "there is no 
doubt ... that if the federal courts believe a state commission is not regulating in 
accordance with federal policy they may bring it to heel." AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. 
BcL, 119 S. Ct. 721, 730 n.6 (1999). Here, in assisting the FCC's administration of this 
federal program, the Commission cannot ignore or frustrate federal goals under the guise 
of the "public" interest. Because the Commission's Order does just this, it cannot stand.13 
In a comparable situation the North Dakota Commission's public interest 
determination under Section 214(e)(2) was reversed as being inconsistent with federal 
law. The North Dakota Commission had determined that the public interest standard for 
a federal ETC applicant was not met because there was no state universal service fund, 
and it speculated that federal universal service funding was not sufficient in rural 
telephone company areas. On appeal, the district court reversed the North Dakota 
Commission's application of Section 214(e)(2) as being inconsistent with federal policies: 
Some states have imposed a separate public interest test for receipt of state funds, 
which arguably could consider state goals not mandated by federal law. There is no State 
Fund public interest requirement in Utah. Under Commission Rule R746-360-7, a 
competitive earner is eligible for state funding by 1) being designated a federal ETC and 
2) being in compliance with Commission rules and orders. Even if there were a State 
Fund public interest requirement, the Utah Legislature created the State Fund to support 
competition without advantage to any carrier, to be sufficient to fund competitive 
universal service, and to be consistent with the federal Act. Utah Code Ann. § 54-86-
15(4)(c), (5), and 9. See also WW Br., pp. 24, 34. These legislative mandates are 
inconsistent with the Order's public interest rationale. 
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Federal case law indicates that in regards to federal funding mechanisms, 
the PSC cannot determine, or rely on its own determination, that the FCCs 
universal service mechanisms are not sufficient to provide for competition 
among universal service providers.... The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 contemplates that separate universal service funds would be 
established at both the state and federal levels. The FCC has established 
mechanisms for the collection and disbursement of monies for the Federal 
Universal Service Fund which are independent of any state fund. By 
denying Western Wireless access to federal subsidies based on North 
Dakota's failure to create a separate state fund, the PSC is frustrating the 
purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
Western Wireless Corp. v. Rural Telephone Company Group et al., Civil No. 00-C-1800, 
Slip Op. at 3-4 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Nov. 13, 2000) (citations omitted) (Supp. ADD-24). The 
Colorado Commission has similarly determined that the operation of its state fund rules 
cannot be allowed to frustrate federal law. In the Matter of Western Wireless Holding 
Co., Inc., Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm'n Docket No. 00K-255T, Decision on Exceptions, 
p. 8 (rel. May 4, 2001) (rejecting an interpretation of its rules that would conflict with 47 
U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)) (Supp. ADD-34). This Court should similarly hold that the 
Commission cannot ignore or frustrate goals and policies of the federal Act. 
In Western Wireless' Initial Brief it explained that Section 253(a) of the Act 
prohibits a state from taking action that prohibits an entity from providing any 
telecommunications service. WW Br., pp. 18-19. The Commission claims Section 
253(a) cannot be implicated because Western Wireless can still provide 
telecommunications services without being designated an ETC. Com. Br., p. 23. 
However, the FCC has ruled that Section 253(a) is violated where a state commission 
imposes a requirement that "[deprives] customers in high-cost areas of the benefits of 
competition by insulating the incumbent LEC from competition." South Dakota Order, ]\ 
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12 (Supp. ADD-7); see also Kansas Order, ^ 8 (ADD-67) (state can violate Section 
253(a) by keeping a competitor out of the universal service market). The Order's 
conclusion that the public interest is not served by competition that might increase the 
size of the State Fund violates Section 253(a) as interpreted by the FCC. 
Western Wireless also argued that the effect of the Order was to burden federal 
universal service mechanisms in violation of Section 253(f). WW Br., p. 36. The 
Commission asserts that Section 253(f) is violated only if the Commission hinders the 
collection of universal service assessments. Com. Br., p. 26. The term "federal universal 
service mechanisms," however, clearly includes assessments, regulations governing 
ETCs, and distributions of funds to earners. Universal Service Order, ^ 816. It is quite 
clear that rejecting competition for federal universal service dollars based on a fear that 
the State Fund might increase in some unspecified amount burdens the ability of federal 
mechanisms to have their intended effect, and thereby violates Section 253(f). 
In essence, the Utah Commission has (under the guise of the public interest) 
refused to allow competition for federal universal service funding because it does not 
want its State Fund to subsidize competition in rural telephone areas. This violates 
federal law and clear federal policies, and cannot be a factor in a federal public interest 
test. 
B. The Order's Public Interest Analysis Favors Incumbent Monopoly 
Providers In Violation Of Federal Law. 
The Commission's Order makes clear an intention to fund incumbent monopolists 
first, and exclude competitors from the universal service market in rural telephone 
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company areas. In fact, it is unclear whether the Commission would ever designate a 
competitive ETC in a rural telephone area. This clearly an advantage to the incumbent, 
which violates the principle of competitive neutrality. 
The Commission misunderstands the "competitive neutrality" requirement of 
Section 253(b). Com Br., p. 24. Western Wireless does not suggest that any earner 
should receive universal service funding, but instead that the rules for designation and 
funding cannot favor the incumbent over the competitor. This is exactly what the FCC 
said in its Kansas Order: "Section 253(b) cannot save a state legal requirement from 
preemption pursuant to sections 253(a) and (d) unless, inter alia, the requirement is 
competitively neutral with respect to, and as between, all of the participants and potential 
participants in the market at issue." Kansas Order, ^ 10 (ADD-68). See also RT 
Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 201 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming 
preemption of Wyoming State rule that awarded incumbent LECs the advantage of 
continued monopoly status to the detriment of competitors). 
By guaranteeing incumbents success in the marketplace, and denying competition 
because of that guarantee, the Commission's Order is not competitively neutral and 
violates federal law. 
C. The Commission Did Not Find Any Other Detriments Associated With 
Western Wirelessy Designation As An ETC. 
As discussed supra, the Commission's Order was based only on a single 
indefensible detriment. No findings support claims that ETC designation would lead to 
an increase in average costs or losses in network economics (Com. Br., p. 18), or that 
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Western Wireless provides inferior service (URTA Br., p. 33). Significantly, URTA has 
not cross-appealed on these issues. Thus, once the Court reverses this sole indefensible 
detriment in the Order and adds findings of benefits of Western Wireless' designation, the 
balancing test will clearly fall in favor of designating Western Wireless as an additional 
ETC in the areas served by the URTA companies. That relief is appropriate and allowed 
bytheAPA. 
VI. THE COMMISSION'S RATE CAP FOR STATE FUND PURPOSES IS 
UNENFORCEABLE AS TO A CMRS PROVIDER. 
A. Section 332(c)(3)(A) Clearly Overrides Sections 214 and 254. 
The arguments of the Commission and URTA on the applicability of Section 
332(c)(3)(a) to ETCs is quite odd. Incumbent earners opposing competition from 
Western Wireless generally claim that Western Wireless must be a state certificated local 
exchange earner to be an ETC. These carriers take the position that Section 214(e) 
overcomes Section 332(c)(3)'s ban on entry regulation. No incumbent carrier, however, 
has ever won this argument. In addition, the FCC has issued clear authority on this point. 
We re-emphasize that the limitation on a state's ability to regulate rates and 
entry by wireless service carriers under section 332(1)(3) does not allow 
states to deny wireless carriers ETC status. 
In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Seventh Report and 
Order and Thirteenth Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 96-45, CC Docket No. 
96-45, FCC 99-119, t 72 (rel. May 28, 1999). See also Universal Service Order, ^ 147 
("Nothing in section 214(e)(1), however, requires that a carrier be subject to the 
jurisdiction of a state commission in order to be designated an [ETC]."). 
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Just recently, the Colorado Commission determined that Section 332(c)(3)(A) 
prohibited any requirement that a CMRS provider be certificated to be eligible for state 
universal service funding: 
Federal law (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)) (no State or local government shall 
have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any 
CMRS providers) prohibits the states from imposing a certification 
requirement on wireless providers; therefore, the Commission has no legal 
authority to certificate wireless carriers. Qwest's and CTA's interpretation 
of § 40-15-208(2)(a), C.R.S., would, in effect, preclude wireless providers 
such as Western Wireless from providing service as EPs within the state. 
[A]n interpretation that would preclude wireless providers from 
participating in the [Colorado state fund] as EPs would likely violate 47 
U.S.C. § 253 . . . . 
In the Matter of Western Wireless Holding Co., Inc., Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm'n 
Docket No. 00K-255T, Decision on Exceptions, pp. 8-9 (rel. May 4, 2001) (Supp. ADD-
34). 
The opposition to Western Wireless in Utah raised this same issue - the 
Commission was urged to impose a requirement that Western Wireless obtain a state 
certificate to be an ETC because Section 214(e) overcomes Section 332(c)(3)(A). See, 
e.g., DI 248, p. 10; DI 222, p. 509.14 
The Commission, however, agreed with Western Wireless on this point and did 
not impose a certification obligation as a condition of ETC designation. DI 198, p. 15. 
14
 Interestingly, URTA's initial pre filed testimony conceded Western Wireless could not 
be subjected to any rate and entry oversight. DI 292, p. 6. URTA's argument on appeal 
(URTA Br., p. 6) is both unsupported and contradicts its position below. 
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However, after agreeing in the Order that Section 332(c)(3)(A) preempts certification 
requirements, the Commission nevertheless argues that Section 332(c)(3)(a) does not 
preempt rate regulation. Com Br., pp. 28-29. The Commission's argument that Section 
214(e) overcomes Section 332(c)(3)(A) rate regulation is contrary to FCC mandates, 
court and other Commission decisions, and its own Order. The real question, is not 
whether Section 332(c)(3)(A) overcomes Section 214(e). The question (answered below) 
is whether a rate cap on a wireless ETC is rate regulation prohibited by Section 
332(c)(3)(A). 
B. A Rate Cap Is Rate Regulation For The Purposes Of Section 
332(c)(3)(A). 
As argued in Western Wireless' Initial Brief, a rate cap is clearly rate regulation, 
no matter the context. WW Br., pp. 39-41. The Commission's only real argument is that 
the Sprint Spectrum case held that assessing universal service contributions is not rate 
regulation, and thus does not violate Section 332(c)(3)(A). Sprint Spectrum v. Kansas 
City SMSA, 149 F.3d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). However, the Sprint Spectrum case is 
not implicated here. The treatment of a universal service assessment is far different than 
the Commission's Order requiring Western Wireless to price its service at a specific rate. 
A universal service requirement that sets a specific rate for a CMRS provider clearly 
constitutes rate regulation. As was decided in Cellular Telecommunications Indus. 
Assoc, v. F.C.C., a state can set rate and entry requirements on wireless universal service 
providers only after meeting the "substitutability" exception of Section 332(c)(3)(A), 
which has not happened here. 168 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussed in WW 
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Brief, pp. 41-42). This precedent requires the Court to strike the rate cap imposed by the 
Commission through the State Fund rules. 
C. In A Competitive Market Affordable Rates Are Accomplished By 
Market Forces And Explicit Subsidies, Not By Rate Caps. 
Both the Commission and URTA argue that a rate cap is the only way for the 
Commission to meet its obligation that basic local service rates be "affordable." Com. 
Br., p. 29; URTA Br., p. 39. Once again, the Commission and URTA fundamentally 
misunderstand how competitive markets work. Congress made clear in the Act that there 
should be "specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve 
and advance universal service." 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5) (emphasis added). Sufficient 
funding is funding that leads to affordable rates. Universal Service Order, f^ 2. The Utah 
Legislature established its State Fund to provide "sufficient" funding to allow competitors 
to provide service at affordable rates. Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15(9). As competition 
pushes the price of services down and prompts carriers to become more efficient 
(Wyoming Order, ^ 13, 17, 22), federal and state universal service subsidies are then 
applied to reduce what the consumer pays to an affordable level. 
It is a fundamental truism of American democracy that government cannot keep 
the cost of bread low simply by mandating a maximum price. Instead, government 
ensures competition among fanners, millers, and bakers, and grocers, and allows the 
market to produce an efficient, affordable price. The Commission and URTA are wrong 
to suggest that a rate cap is the only way to achieve affordable pricing. This Court, 
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unlike the Commission, should recognize the benefits and requirements of bringing 
universal service competition to its citizens. 
VII. THE COMMISSION FAILED TO FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THEAPA 
Western Wireless maintains that the Commission established a "rule" without a 
formal rulemaking when it mandated that each incumbent's rates (which were not part of 
the record) represents the "Affordable Base Rate" under the State Fund rules. WW Br., 
pp 42-45. The Commission's response is not persuasive - the Commission does not have 
carte blanche to create rules in the context of an administrative adjudication. Com. Br., 
pp. 33-34. The Affordable Base Rate was not put at issue in this case, did not need to be 
determined, and is of general applicability to all ETCs and prospective ETCs. An 
Affordable Base Rate should be established on record evidence in accordance with the 
rulemaking provisions mandated by the Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should reverse the Order as requested, and grant 
the relief sought by Western Wireless. 
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